

LOTTERY BETTING

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Introduction. This chapter is based upon research for a paper given at the 2002 Conference of the Societas Linguisticae Europaea in Potsdam, Germany.

Austin used the phrase “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow”, Austin 1975:5, (hereinafter “the betting performative”) to illustrate his notion of performative utterances as language types that have non-linguistic effects on the world. While, in places, Austin said that performative utterances relied, in part, on the context for their effect, in other places, Austin gives the role of context lip service, at best. When briefly discussing the betting performative, Austin does not mention the effect of context at all. Hard Science Linguistics (HSL) theory can easily demonstrate the effects of the surroundings i.e., Austin’s context. This study looks at the effect that the surroundings had on people who perform a simple task (lottery betting) in a “controlled” environment where Austin’s betting performative would be expected to be used. The study showed that the task could be successfully completed regardless of utterance and, indeed, with no utterance at all. As such, the study challenges the traditional claim that it is the language that performs the act.

Description of the Study. The State of New Jersey operates a statewide lottery that is administered through private vendors in stores in local communities. Because the lottery is state controlled, there is a small range of variation in the operation of individual lottery sales from store to store or community to community. A lottery player¹ may purchase a lottery ticket at any vending location throughout the state in the same way. The State requires every lottery location to make certain materials available to players, e.g., lottery slips, pens, etc., to display certain signs and advertisements, and to have certain equipment available to account for sales. The real world surroundings in any one store are unlikely to change in any linguistically meaningful way over the short term. A lottery purchase involves only two people; the person authorized and trained to sell lottery chances, the “seller”, and the lottery purchaser, the “player”. Lottery

betting in New Jersey thus allows us to see a “minimal” linguistic situation with a limited scope occurring with the smallest possible number of people. State control creates what is, in effect, a series of linguistic laboratories.

The reader may wonder whether the purchase of a ticket or the filling out of a lottery slip is actually a bet, in Austin’s sense. Austin does not describe a bet. He merely states the betting performative. Austin’s bet can best be described as “informal”; a bet perhaps between friends. The State of New Jersey considers the lottery a form of betting. The preprinted forms that players use that are supplied by the Lottery Commission to sellers are referred to as “bet slips” (hereinafter “slips”) in the instructions for each game, printed on the back of each slip. The back of every slip and instant game ticket (hereinafter “tickets”) contains the admonition: “If you or someone you know has a gambling problem, call: 1-800-GAMBLER”. In the “Prizes” section on the reverse side of the “Jersey Cash 5” slip, for example, players are told, “Fifty percent of all money bet is placed into the prize pool” (emphasis added). In addition, the lottery was created not only as an source of revenue for the state but as a way to eliminate or control the type of illegal gambling formerly referred to as “the numbers”.

The State directs the vendor to offer lottery chances in certain ways, going so far as to require certain standardized types of displays, supplies, and equipment for the seller and player to use. Lottery bets are made in stores that sell other merchandise, in a proscribed area of the store set aside exclusively for lottery betting. In some stores, this area is very small but in CamPark Liquors (the store in which the observations were made), the lottery area is large and elaborate. Except for the selection of winning numbers for certain games, which is broadcast on television, radio, and other media, the entire lottery betting process is conducted in the store in public view. The type of game generally referred to as an “instant game” or a “rub off” in which the player purchases a ticket with spots to rub off with a coin can be completed from bet to payoff in the store.

The study consists of the analysis of twenty-five recorded observations of lottery betting in one store in the town of Woodbine, New Jersey. In each

instance, a player was observed approaching the lottery counter to either play a slip with or to purchase one or more lottery tickets or both. In the case of CamPark Liquors, several different employees are authorized to accept lottery bets. Because lottery bets are made in stores, players sometimes combined betting with other purchases. In many locations, the lottery sales area is immediately adjacent to the checkout area. Because of the noise level in the store, the details of every conversation could not be recorded with absolute fidelity. However, enough information was recorded for each transaction to indicate the type of lottery game the player wished to play, the gross details of the method of play (handing a slip to the seller, purchasing a ticket, etc.), and any other gross activity that occurred during the purchase. Conversation not part of the actual purchase was ignored for the purpose of this study. In most cases, there was no conversation unrelated to lottery betting. Players often made more than one lottery purchase, e.g., a slip and a ticket. No additional interviews with either players or sellers were made.

There are two broad categories of lottery game. In the “traditional” game, a player bets a player-determined amount of money that three or more digits (depending on the game) will be drawn in a certain order in a publicly held procedure at the Lottery Commission’s headquarters at a certain time and on a certain date. A player approaches the counter and either tells the digits and the other details of the bet to the seller or, more usually, fills out a bet slip with the necessary information and hands the completed slip to the seller. The seller records the lottery bet in a machine connected to Lottery Headquarters, collects the money for the bets, and hands the player the appropriate receipt(s). Traditional games have names like “Pick 3”, “Jersey Cash 5”, or “The Big Game”. A bet slip has room for up to five bets for the same game. Therefore, a bet slip may represent between one to five individual bets. When a player has the seller check a previously played slip to determine whether he or she has won a prize, the player may replay the same numbers by so indicating to the seller and paying the new bet amount without filling out a new bet slip.

The Lottery Commission also sponsors a large number of “Instant Games”, which are games whose tickets have a number of “rub off” spots, thus accounting for a colloquialism for “Instant Games”: “rub offs”. If the player uncovers matching spots, the player wins a prize as mentioned on the game ticket. The player may rub off the spots in the store immediately after purchase and determine whether he or she has won a prize, hence the name “Instant Game”. Instant Games have names like “2002 and Beyond” and “Baseball Bucks”. Each ticket contains one bet. To place more than one bet on the same instant game, a player must purchase a ticket for each bet he or she wishes to make. Rolls of unsold instant game tickets are displayed in transparent boxes, stacked to form a divider on top of the lottery counter. Each box holds tickets for only one instant game. Each game has only one box. The store labeled each display box with a store-assigned number in a small blue circular label for players’ convenience.

For the purposes of the study, each player was assigned a number starting with B1 and continuing in chronological order to B25.

Analysis of the Observations. In 21 out of 25 instances (84%), players purchased at least one instant game ticket. In 8 out of 25 instances (32%), players bought at least one instant game ticket and played a traditional game, thereby placing lottery bets in two different ways on the same occasion. In two out of three instances where a player recited the digits of a traditional game to the seller, the player did not purchase a ticket. In 16 out of 21 instances (76%) in which a player purchased one or more tickets, the same player did not play a traditional game. No betting instance lasted more than about 2 minutes. On occasion, a queue formed with one player making lottery purchases at a time (turn taking behavior).

Three players (B10, B14 and B15) pointed at a transparent box holding the instant game ticket that he or she wished to purchase. B14 did not name the instant game that he wanted to play but referred to it in a general way (“I’ll take one of these rub-offs”); Two players (B10 and B15) both named the desired instant game and pointed at it. One player (B21) replayed a losing ticket and only

used the words “Give me one of these” to refer to the desired ticket. During one observation (B5), both player and seller were completely silent during the transaction which was resolved through the use of a completed betting slip and the exact amount of payment necessary for the purchase. Another player (B25) silently placed his bet but engaged in some small talk regarding previously purchased slips and tickets that he wanted checked. Most of his quips were with another store patron but he did answer the seller’s question about whether he wanted his slips back. Three players (B7, B9, and B23) told the seller what numbers they wished to bet on by reciting a series of digits to the seller.

A traditional linguist using Austin’s performative theory or speech act theory would look at the language used to determine what acts were performed. A surprisingly wide variety in language occurred during the observations, summarized in **Table 1**. Counting silence, there were eight different ways that players made lottery bets.

None	2
“Give”	10
Referring to Instant Games by Number only	2
Referring to Instant Games by Name only	7
Reciting digits to be played	3
Amount only	1
“Take”	1
x on y	2

Table 1 - Language Use

In these observations, no instance of “bet” was recorded. Thus, there was no instance of any variant of Austin’s betting performative *per se*. Using traditional speech act theory, a linguist would need to either explain away the lack of Austin’s performative, perhaps by questioning whether lottery betting were really betting in Austin’s sense, whatever sense that may have been, or by suggesting that **Table 1** contained surrogates for the betting performative. Either approach would lead a traditional linguist into attempts to save the theory and away from

the real world observations. As we will see, HSL provides a more accurate analysis of the case.

If we examine the data, we find that a players successfully placed lottery bets in five ways, counting Austin's performative as a theoretical possibility. Some of these are non-verbal. **Table 2** shows the number of instances in each category. The tradition would discount the non-verbal instances as being "uninteresting" but HSL can account for them in a meaningful way and demonstrate their importance.

Present slip to seller	7
Recite numbers to seller	3
Name Instant Game (by name or number)	21
Point to an instant game (ostension)	3
Austin's performative	0

Table 2 - Types of lottery betting

The [lottery sales] Linkage

We assume that the buyer is legally able to make a lottery purchase, the sales person is legally authorized to sell lottery chances, and the buyer has sufficient money to pay for the purchases. Since the Lottery is State regulated, these assumptions are warranted; no observation negates them. Therefore, we will not model these aspects of actual situations.

We set up a linkage called [lottery sales] that we will only partially describe in this paper. The lottery signs both inside and outside the store are the first objects that we model. Since some signs change, e.g., the signs announcing the top prize in certain games change frequently; some signs are temporary, e.g., signs announcing new games or recent local winners; and some signs are more or less permanent, it would be cumbersome in this chapter to enumerate them as individual props. Because the aggregate of lottery signs on the exterior of the store or meant to be visible from outside the store (in windows, etc.), regardless of their actual number, effect a single expectation procedure, they may be treated as one prop, [outside signs], with the property <outside signs visible>. Similarly,

we shall treat the aggregate of lottery signs inside the store as one prop, [inside signs], with a <inside signs visible> property. We must always model [inside signs] and [outside signs] in [lottery sales] in a complete description of [lottery sales]; this is verified by having observed the collection of interior and exterior signs at CamPark Liquors and many other lottery sales locations. In a more complete description of the [lottery sales] linkage, we would also describe the channels associated with the signs since, communicatively, the visibility and readability of the signs is important. Here we will simply assume that the signs are clearly visible.

In the real world, both sets of signs play an informative purpose. However, for [lottery sales] the informative function of the signs is secondary and will not be considered. Instead, we model the interplay of signs and expectation procedures. Recall that not every store in the State of New Jersey sells lottery chances and, further, lottery sales are not made in all parts of a store. Someone who wishes to play the lottery must be able to determine which stores sell lottery chances. The lottery signs are indications of a place where lottery bets can be made. In a complete description of lottery sales, we would model expectation procedures that interact with [outside signs] and [inside signs]. We can, if we wish, expand the linkage to include observations as “far back” as the selection of the store that a player enters to place a lottery bet using an expectation procedure and [outside signs]. Since lottery sales take place within restricted areas inside a store, we could use another expectation procedure and [inside signs] to model the player’s moving toward the lottery counter.

We model two participants in [lottery sales], [Bettor] for the player and [Agent] for the seller. [Bettor] has five tasks: <enter store>, <approach counter>, <see Agent>, <place bet>, and <leave>, to be executed in that order. [Agent] has one task: <serve>. <enter store> and <approach counter> model the obvious but important observations that all lottery players who were observed played the lottery in a particular place, i.e., inside the store and at the lottery sales counter. We model the surroundings with props such as [tickets], [slips], [sales counter], etc. The task <see Agent> models the fact that lottery bets are not self-service.

Players cannot retrieve tickets from a vending machine but only from an authorized individual. If a seller is not within the lottery sales area, a lottery sale cannot take place. Once the seller is at the counter, the player may place a lottery bet <place bet>. Once this task is accomplished, the player's job is done; we model this with the <leave> task in which the player physically leaves the lottery sales area. This task allows us to model a queue of players placing lottery bets.

[Agent] has one task <serve> that models the seller's responses to the player's actions. <serve> consists of a number of subtasks that interweave with [Bettor]'s tasks. We will discuss this below.

[Bettor] has a property that we may call <at counter>. No store in New Jersey sells only lottery chances². Every lottery venue sells other merchandise. The <at counter> property accounts for [Bettor]'s physical location. If -<at counter>, the tasks in [lottery sales] cannot proceed. When the player is at the counter, he waits for the lottery sales seller to indicate his or her readiness to accept the sale. Once the player gets a suitable response, the player may begin to indicate his purchase. The <see Agent> task that models this may be written as follows: <see Agent> = <at counter> x <expect response from Agent> -> <ready to order>. Note that we may have to include a time delay along with <expect response from Agent> to account for the possibility that the seller may be somewhere other than at the lottery counter.

The reader may say that the player may begin to fill out slips before the seller arrives at the counter and that this should be accounted for in the <see Agent> task. Indeed, this was observed, e.g., in B10. The player arrived at the lottery counter while the seller was talking to her boss and another employee. The player removed a lottery slip from the carousel containing uncompleted slips and filled it out. However, it wasn't until the seller stepped to the lottery sales counter that the player was able to hand the completed slip to the seller. The player cannot place a bet until the seller is present, i.e., the player cannot place the bet until he gives the slip to the seller. This behavior concerns us here. Perhaps, in a more complete description of [lottery sales], we might model the

completion of a slip but, for now, it is unnecessary. The <see Agent> task accounts for the communicative behavior observed. The name of the expectation procedure, <expect response from Agent> should not suggest that this is an expectation procedure that requires a particular kind of response. It may be satisfied simply by the seller's physical presence behind the lottery sales counter, as was seen in B10 and other observations.

Once the seller acknowledges his or her readiness to proceed, the player expects the seller to accept the bet <expect Agent to accept>³. The player tells the seller what his bet will be <place bet>. Since there are two types of games, traditional games and instant games, we model the possibility that a player may place one or both types of bet in some combination. Furthermore, there are several possibilities within each type. There are at least 5 traditional games and at least 32 instant games⁴. There were several ways of placing a bet on each type of game, see **Table 2**. Rather than listing all of the possibilities here (a list that may be outdated by the time this chapter is read), we will model two broad possibilities. The player may name or otherwise indicate an instant game <indicate game> or may in some way indicate the digits of a particular traditional game on which to bet <complete digits>. We may write <place bet> = <expect Agent to accept>⁵ x <indicate game> v <complete digits>, in which “v” (or) is to be understood inclusively, as a partial description of <place bet>. In observation B5, both the player and the seller were silent during the observation. There was not even a greeting or a farewell, yet a lottery bet was placed. In observation B25, the player silently placed his bet⁶ and the seller only stated the amount due. In observation B23, the player asked for a “Big Game”, a traditional game but, rather than giving the seller specific digits, said “You surprise me with the number”⁷. As **Table 2** shows, players pointed at an instant game in three instances. In traditional speech act theory, there is no way to account for the effect of non-verbal communication on a non-linguistic act⁸. Using HSL theory, if we set up a linkage to model each observed instance of lottery betting, we could use the same model for B5 and B25 or for the instances of ostension as for any other instance.

Once he has placed his bet, the player pays for his bet <pay>, a subtask of <place bet>. The player needs to know the total amount due <get total>. He tenders an amount equal to or exceeding the total to the seller <give money to Agent> and, after doing so, he expects to get back a record of his purchases, either receipts for the slips or the actual instant game tickets <expect receipt>. We write <pay> = <get total> -> <give money to Agent> -> <expect receipt> x <get receipt>. The player may calculate the amount due since the player has control over the amount to be bet. Furthermore, all instant games have fixed prices⁹. In some cases, e.g., B5, the player tendered the exact change to the seller; in other cases, the seller announced the amount due. In the <get receipt> task, we see two expectation procedures, <expect entry> (the player anticipates that his bet will be properly recorded) and <expect paper record> (the player expects to receive a receipt for the completed lottery slip or the actual instant game ticket). Player takes the receipt(s) from the seller <take receipt>. The <pay> subtask completes the <place bet> task. The player leaves the lottery sales area <leave>.

The seller responds to the player's actions. In a broad sense, their interaction can be seen as a type of turn-taking behavior. [Agent]'s single task, <serve>, consists of several subtasks. The seller observes a customer entering the lottery sales area to place a lottery bet <see Bettor>. The seller prepares to accept the bet <greet>, takes the order from the player <accept order>, fills the order by entering the traditional game information into the lottery machine or getting the indicated instant game ticket(s) <get order>, gets the payment from the player <get payment>, gives the receipts or tickets to the player <give receipt>, and terminates the sale <farewell>. We write <serve> = <see Bettor> -> <greet> -> <accept order> -> <get order> -> <get payment> -> <farewell>.

We have seen above that, at times, the mere presence of the seller behind the lottery counter is sufficient to indicate the seller's readiness to accept lottery bets. When the seller observes a player in the lottery sales area and indicates her readiness to accept a bet <indicate readiness>, the seller anticipates that the individual in the lottery sales area will place a bet <expect

order>. However, since the store sells more merchandise than just lottery chances and since the lottery sales area is adjacent to other sales areas, a person who is physically located in the lottery sales area may actually be present for some purpose other than placing a lottery bet. On 3/23/02, there was a queue for lottery tickets. Players B12 and B13 placed lottery bets. Player B14 began a conversation with B12 who lingered in the area¹⁰. The seller was not certain whether B14 was a lottery player or simply an acquaintance of B12's. The seller asked B14 "Are you just here with" B12 "or can I get you something?" In terms of our model, [Agent] attempted to determine the value of <expect order>¹¹. In a more complete description of the [lottery sales] linkage, we would model a subtask that would determine whether a person, physically at the counter was a player or not. This subtask sets the value of <expect order>.

The above description is sufficient for our discussion of expectation procedures and Austin's betting performative. We have seen that both a player and a seller anticipate the behavior of the other that are created by the surroundings. The player anticipates the seller to accept the bet and the seller anticipates that the player will place the bet. While the details of the bet vary from player to player, they vary over a very small range, due to the surroundings. A player cannot walk into a store and expect the seller to accept a \$10,000 bet on the outcome of a football game. In New Jersey, this behavior may result in a crime being committed.

The State of New Jersey limits acceptable bets and says that it, through its sellers, will accept any bet within those limits. What we see is that there are three parts to a bet:

1. The offer of a bet
2. The subject (and amount) of the bet and
3. The acceptance of the bet

The lottery system says that sellers will accept (#3) certain bets (#2) placed by any and all players (#1). By limiting the subject of lottery bets (#2), the State of New Jersey has limited the scope of behavior needed to place a bet. By saying that its sellers will accept (#3) all bets of a certain type (#2), the State limits the

need to discuss whether a bet is acceptable. We have observed that only the offer of the bet (#1) need occur.

What of Austin's performative? Once again, Austin's performative is "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow", Austin 1975:5. Austin says that the verb "bet" performs the act of betting. There are several problems with this. First and most obvious, there is no acceptance of the bet. A bet, as we have seen, requires at least two people. Austin's performative occurs in isolation¹². While there is a subject matter of sorts (rain tomorrow), we do not know what would satisfy the subject matter and how much is being risked, if anything. Indeed, Austin's performative may be merely rhetorical in the proper situation (think of Noah). The reader may claim that the betting performative was merely an illustration and not completely described. If we read Austin's lectures as a whole, we see that he initially mentioned the role of context in performatives but placed less and less emphasis on context as his lectures proceeded. By the end of his lectures, context disappears as a factor in his performative theory. Austin approaches a major insight and then backs away from it because the tradition only looks at language.

The reader from the speech act school may object that these explanations do not explain why the verb "bet" was not used in lottery situations or whether the observations were, in some way, equivalent to the betting performative. To answer the objection, we informally consider a better-developed situation similar to Austin's in which the verb "bet" might be used. Consider two friends, Tom and Jerry, who watch a football game in Jerry's living room¹³. Each person roots for a different team. At one particularly interesting point in the game, Tom says to Jerry "I bet you \$1.00 that my team makes the first down on the next play." Jerry says, "You're on." Tom loses, as usual, because, to make matters short, his team is incompetent. In this situation, we have explicitly stated the three parts of a bet that we have seen. The offer of the bet is "I bet you \$1.00 that..." The subject matter of the bet is that "my team makes the first down on the next play". The acceptance is "You're on."

In the case of a lottery bet, very little is left to chance (other than the outcome of the bet). Prior to the offer of the bet, Jerry had no reason to anticipate that Tom would make the offer or, even if he did, he would not know what the subject matter of the bet might have been. Games are spontaneous events. While there is certainly reason to believe that a team would attempt a first down sometime during the game, Tom and Jerry could have predicted before the game that a first down attempt would occur at the precise moment that it did. Tom made the offer but had to wait (for however long) to see whether Jerry would accept the bet. Jerry might have accepted the bet or perhaps he wouldn't. The player had a virtual certainty that the seller would accept the bet. If we set up a linkage for the Tom and Jerry type of bet, there would be no expectation procedures that one person would offer a \$1.00 bet on the outcome of certain events in a particular televised football game or that the other would accept the bet because we could not predict the outcome before the offer of the bet occurred. In short, the difference between the two situations is the collection of expectation procedures that exist in one but not the other¹⁴.

On the other hand, a lottery-betting linkage is full of expectation procedures. We have seen some of them above but a fuller description of the linkage would need to include others. The player believes that the prices are accurate, that the seller is authorized, etc. In many cases, the values of these expectation procedures only become negative in unusual circumstances so the need for expectation procedures is not obvious. Because the surroundings in lottery sales are so standardized, we may speculate that task completion is also the subject of an expectation procedure. We actually have evidence for this. The players and the sellers knew what to do. They knew what each other anticipated and complied with those anticipations. Perhaps, then, in a fuller model of [lottery sales], we should couple a task completion expectation procedure with each task. For example, [Bettor] not only has a <pay> task but both [Bettor] and [Agent] expect [Bettor] to have (and complete) the <pay> task.

Conclusions. From what we have seen above, we may make certain predictions. Perhaps the strongest prediction that we can make on the evidence

produced by this study is that when people participate in repetitive tasks, the tasks include large numbers of expectation procedures that occur in a more or less “fixed” setting. We may describe “narrow contexts” as situations with significant expectations¹⁵, such as ticket booths, pumping gas, toll booths, checkout counters, and the like, in which the occurrence of certain aspects of the surroundings is predictable. Indeed, what may be seen as efficiency¹⁶ in these areas may be due to the fixed nature of the anticipations of all parties that participate in these kinds of behavior.

Expectations in limited circumstances are ubiquitous. Expectation procedures guide the completion of tasks. This study suggests that expectation procedures arise from the design of the surroundings or, if viewed from the perspective of the surroundings, that the design of the surroundings promotes certain expectation procedures. A parallel area of research that may prove useful is the study of “custom”, i.e., repetitive and originally unplanned activity that may also create expectations, e.g., preparations for religious services, “pickup” games, and visits to relatives¹⁷. This paper has not set forth the full description of the [lottery sales] linkage. A complete description would demonstrate the role that expectation procedures play in controlling tasks in [lottery sales].

Studies such as this one make it obvious that linguistics needs to examine much more than grammatical relations or language in order to explain how humans communicate. Linguistics has stalled because of the outmoded beliefs that everything about language can be explained through grammar and that the only interesting area of communications is language.

Bibliography

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¹ In this paper, “player” means the person who places a bet. “Seller” means the person who accepts the bet.

² Some states have “betting parlors”, e.g., New York’s Off-Tack Betting stores (OTB), whose sole “merchandise” is betting.

³ There were no observed instances in which <expect Agent to accept> would have a negative value. It might have a negative value if the player was underage or the lottery machine was not acting properly. A sign might indicate the latter occurrence.

⁴ These numbers may vary with different promotions. Furthermore, new games may be added and old games may be retired.

⁵ The location of the expectation procedure should not be understood as to require the expectation procedure to be satisfied before the tasks. A player might hand a slip to a seller who may try to enter it into the lottery machine only to find that the lottery machine will not function properly. In such a case, the task would be performed before the expectation procedure would change value from positive to negative. No occurrence such as this was observed.

⁶ He did, however, exchange quips with another customer.

⁷ New Jersey lottery machines, into which all traditional games purchases are entered, are capable of generating a set of random digits appropriate to different games.

⁸ We could claim that some non-verbal acts are actually instances of language and therefore satisfy speech act theory. We could also claim that a much wider variety of language performs non-linguistic acts. The latter seems to be what the tradition has done. In this way, it seems as though nearly everything is an act, including “having” or “being”. Speech act theory has moved away from Austin’s tight coupling of language to acts performed (“bet” performs the act of betting; “We find the defendant guilty” performs the act of rendering someone guilty of a crime, etc.) in either an excess of enthusiasm or in an attempt to save the theory by so broadening the notion of non-linguistic act as to make it meaningless.

⁹ The prices vary from game to game over a range of \$1.00 to \$5.00 at the time of this writing.

¹⁰ He was talking on a cell phone.

¹¹ This little observation also indicates that individuals in close proximity to each other may be in different “contexts” as far as communicative behavior is concerned. Sometimes, it is not easy to see just what context they are in. When this difficulty occurs, we can predict that some sort of clarifying communicative behavior will occur.

¹² It is an utterance “out of context” unlike some of Austin’s other examples. See my chapter on verdictives.

¹³ We should assume that the usual football-gazing accoutrements are present: a television set, a comfortable couch or chairs, liquid and solid refreshments, etc. We can see these are parallels to pens, signs, slips, etc. at the lottery counter.

¹⁴ While I do not wish to pursue this point, we may speculate on whether certain expressions are used to “create contexts”, thereby limiting communicative behavior and creating certain expectations.

¹⁵ This is obviously not a satisfactory definition. However, it may serve to point the way toward fruitful future work.

¹⁶ Or routine. Routines are repetitive behaviors with fixed goals (and fixed expectation procedures).

¹⁷ Human-animal communications, e.g., communications with a pet, may be “customary” in the sense that interspecies communication may rely more on expectations than intrahuman communications do since the ameliorating effects of verbal language are generally not available.